This chapter critically examines Ned Block’s two-factor theory of mental content, which attempts to combine narrow content (conceptual role) with wide content (referential relations). Through analysis of Block’s “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” it demonstrates how his theory aims to capture both the cognitive aspect of meaning through narrow content and its referential aspects through wide content. The chapter systematically evaluates Block’s framework by examining key examples from cognitive science, including concept learning, cognitive mapping in rats, and mental imagery. While Block’s approach avoids some pitfalls of purely internalist accounts, the analysis reveals fundamental problems with coordinating the two factors and naturalizing intentionality. The discussion shows that Block’s theory ultimately presupposes rather than explains intentionality, as narrow content appears to lack genuine semantic properties. Critical examination demonstrates that Block’s framework fails to meet several core requirements for an adequate theory of mental representation, including the naturalization of intentionality and proper account of misrepresentation. The chapter concludes that despite its sophisticated attempt to bridge internalist and externalist perspectives, the two-factor theory cannot sustain its pluralistic approach to content, setting the stage for exploration of externalist alternatives in subsequent chapters.