The opening chapter analyzes Daniel Dennett’s interpretivism and its concept of the intentional stance as a framework for understanding intentionality, rather than as a direct account of mental representations. It demonstrates that intentionality, while essential to mental representations, extends beyond systems with explicit mental capacities, thereby defining a broader class of cognitive systems that can be attributed mental representations. The chapter analyzes how Dennett’s approach provides a partial defense against anti-representationalism through its emphasis on predictive and explanatory success, while falling short of a full defense due to its lack of detailed engagement with content and reference. Through examination of both personal and subpersonal levels of description, it explores the relationship between rationality and mental representations, examining the heuristic value of the rationality principle in attributing mental states. The discussion challenges the necessity of language for representational content and advocates for a pluralistic view that accommodates non-linguistic phenomena. The chapter establishes foundational perspectives for further inquiry into mental representations in cognitive systems, highlighting both Dennett’s contributions and the limitations of describing cognitive systems solely through intentional terms.