Chapter 8 begins our discussion of vice epistemology and the development of a neo-Stoic vice epistemology (which Chap. 9 will complete). First, we examine the extant approaches to epistemic vice. As epistemic virtue is often divided into two camps (reliabilists and responsibilist), vice epistemology includes two major, competing general approaches. The obstructivist construes an epistemic vice as, essentially, a trait that systemically prevents the getting, keeping, or sharing of knowledge. Motivationalism with respect to epistemic vice is the view which sees the heart of vice as deficient motivation: epistemic vicious belief is belief that is insufficiently grounded in the motive to get to the truth. With these views explained, the chapter deploys two kinds of worries for them. The first appeals to the same problematic orthodoxies that prompts our whole discussion: EVE and ESE. I argue that obstructivism is committed to both EVE and ESE orthodoxy and that motivationalism, while possibly rejecting EVE, must nevertheless endorse ESE. If we want a genuinely unorthodox epistemology, neither obstructivism nor motivationalism fit the bill. Second, each approach faces its own worry external to our discussion so far. The obstructivist, like the virtue reliabilist with which it has an affinity, will have trouble with Evil Demon worlds: in them our standard vices promote knowledge and our virtues obstruct it. We get the standard counterintuitive view that the obstructivist must count virtues as vices and vices as virtues in such worlds. Second, the motivationalist will face counterexamples where an intuitively vicious agent cares about the truth and tries to obtain it. Thus, motivationalism cannot correctly diagnose what goes wrong with such cases. We need a new account of epistemic vice: Chap. 9 develop such an account based on our neo-Stoic theory from Chaps. 6 and 7 .