In this chapter, we begin constructing our neo-Stoic virtue epistemology. From Chap. 4 , we get a discussion of Stoic moral theory—in particular, the Stoic account of value and virtue. The first two sections of Chap. 6 follow the Stoics to sketch parallel principles for epistemology. Specifically, this chapter defends: (1) The epistemic telos/goal is identical to epistemic virtue (=believing epistemically virtuously), (2*) Epistemic virtue (=believing epistemically virtuously) is the sole bearer of fundamental epistemic value (i.e. virtue is the sole epistemic good), (3) Positively evaluated end states (e.g. true belief, knowledge, understanding, justified belief) have non-fundamental epistemic value (=they are epistemically preferred indifferents), and (4*) Epistemic virtue is a kind of stochastic skill (=a skill that admits of a telos/skopos distinction). (1) follows from the Stoic insistence that virtue is the good, and (2*) specifies that only virtue as such fundamental value. Their doctrine of preferred indifferents influences (3): the end states in question are like externals with value but not goodness. Finally (4*) extends the Stoic conception of moral virtue as a skill to epistemology. However, we have only a formal notion of virtue—what’s missing, so far, is an account of epistemic virtue specified in (1)–(4*) with more determinate content. We turn to this task in the next chapter.