This chapter extends the discussion of Stoic moral theory from Chap. 4 to argue that the Stoics offer the kind of internalism—(Aretaic Internalism2)—our unorthodox approach to epistemic virtue requires. We need an internalism such that the value of virtue derives from the way that we seek its target rather than from the aimed-at state/object itself. First, the Stoics offer a moral version of epistemic internalism: an action need not have external success to count as virtuous. Second, the Stoic distinction between an appropriate action and perfect/right action gives an example of our two actions can differ along their axiological statuses even if the content, effects, etc. remain identical. A perfect action differs from an appropriate only insofar as the former (but not the latter) is grounded by the Sage’s knowledge and consistent character. an action is perfect because of how the agent “produces” it, rather than by the agent’s aim or intention in acting. Thus, the Stoics provide a moral version of Chap. 3 ’s (Aretaic Internalism2), which is precisely the sort of theoretical framework our virtue epistemology needs to reject EVE and ESE orthodoxy.