In this brief introduction, we lay out the motivations and maneuvers for the work. We begin with reflections on epistemic value. Though a diversity of accounts of such value are offered and discussed, we should note something previous unnoticed: that they, for all their differences, share a common assumption about the nature of fundamental epistemic value. Specifically, they assume that the sort of thing that bears fundamental epistemic value is an end state produced by cognition. We’ll term this an orthodoxy with respect to epistemic value. Rejecting this unseen orthodoxy motivates the current work. We’ll also see another, more often recognized, orthodoxy in virtue epistemology; namely, epistemological externalism. Thus, we need a theory that can reject both orthodoxies—i.e. a radically unorthodox epistemology. This will be an internalist virtue epistemology. Yet, internalism by itself won’t suffice: we need a radically new account of epistemic value. For this, we turn to the ancient Stoics. Thus, we’ll seek a neo-Stoic virtue epistemology which offers us the heretical rejection of the twin orthodoxies mentioned above.