This chapter argues that the onward flow of nature is interrupted by two transmutations of the natural with respect to the true and with respect to right. The first transmutation brings with it the possibility of deceit (discussed in chapter 3). The real becomes true when an account of it can be given which relies for its acceptance on trust in the bearer of that truth. In this sense, truth depends on conscientiousness. The claim to truth is the claim to be telling the truth, a claim depending for its efficacy on the possibility of lying. That possibility is at the core of the inner self, the turning away from the world in the very act of presenting to the world, i.e., duplicitousness. This duplicitous is rooted in the prior duplicity of nature, which Schelling diagnoses. The second transmutation is that of the interactions of nature into questions of right or ought. Constitutive of natural processes are relations of responsibility and culpability, benefit and harm, hospitality and hostility, as Karen Barad shows. However, the taking of responsibility, the accounting for benefit and harm and justness of judgements, requires a stepping out of the flow of natural time, a detachment which is nevertheless always engaged. This occurs when we ask not alone what is the case, but whether it ought to be or not. That question arises out of nature, but marks a self-transcendence of nature beyond itself towards the right, irreducible to benefit or harm.

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The True and the Right: Nature and Fallenness

  • Felix Ó Murchadha

摘要

This chapter argues that the onward flow of nature is interrupted by two transmutations of the natural with respect to the true and with respect to right. The first transmutation brings with it the possibility of deceit (discussed in chapter 3). The real becomes true when an account of it can be given which relies for its acceptance on trust in the bearer of that truth. In this sense, truth depends on conscientiousness. The claim to truth is the claim to be telling the truth, a claim depending for its efficacy on the possibility of lying. That possibility is at the core of the inner self, the turning away from the world in the very act of presenting to the world, i.e., duplicitousness. This duplicitous is rooted in the prior duplicity of nature, which Schelling diagnoses. The second transmutation is that of the interactions of nature into questions of right or ought. Constitutive of natural processes are relations of responsibility and culpability, benefit and harm, hospitality and hostility, as Karen Barad shows. However, the taking of responsibility, the accounting for benefit and harm and justness of judgements, requires a stepping out of the flow of natural time, a detachment which is nevertheless always engaged. This occurs when we ask not alone what is the case, but whether it ought to be or not. That question arises out of nature, but marks a self-transcendence of nature beyond itself towards the right, irreducible to benefit or harm.