In this chapter, we argue that the militarized fights against galamsey predate the period under scrutiny here. However, we limit our analysis of state capture to the period between 2017 and 2024, a period during which three successive military interventions were organized to fight galamsey: Operation Vanguard, Operation Halt II, and Operation Halt Relaunched (hereafter, Operation Halt III). We argue that three main features make these failed militarized fights in this period distinct. First, these operations were launched to fulfil the personal vow of President Akufo-Addo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), to fight and stop galamsey, even if it cost him the presidency. This is the first time, in the last three decades of democratic government in Ghana, a sitting Ghanaian president has publicly tied his political future to the fight against galamsey. Through this bold declaration, the president elevated galamsey to a national crisis of catastrophic proportions that threatens the very existence of the ecosystem of Ghana. Second, the blanket ban on ASM by the government of Ghana: both legal and illegal ASM was banned for over a year. This signalled an uncompromising stance of the government on the issue, further underscoring the president's commitment to combat and eradicate  galamsey. Third, unprecedented military operations: for the first time in Ghana’s recent democratic history, three successive military operations were rolled out within eight years to fight galamsey. These factors are crucial to our analysis of state capture. For example, the president, who is the  most powerful political officeholder, the highest politician through whom the state can be captured, was the one leading the war against galamsey. Also, the ban on ASM and the three successive military operations illustrated  the president’s determination to keep his vow. Yet, under his leadership the fight against galamsey failed. This failure is central to our argument, as it raises two poignant questions:  Why did the militarized fight against galamsey fail? And why did the president order the suspension of the military operations when the galamsey menace had aggravated? No official reasons were given for the suspensions. (But What). But what is indisputable is the inconsistency between the reasons for launching the operations and the suspension. We see this as evidence of state capture, which is often marked by internal contradictions, engendered by the symbiotic relationship between the formal state and the shadow state—with the latter feeding off the former.

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Militarized Fights Against Galamsey, 2017–2024

  • Jasper Abembia Ayelazuno,
  • Maxwell Akansina Aziabah

摘要

In this chapter, we argue that the militarized fights against galamsey predate the period under scrutiny here. However, we limit our analysis of state capture to the period between 2017 and 2024, a period during which three successive military interventions were organized to fight galamsey: Operation Vanguard, Operation Halt II, and Operation Halt Relaunched (hereafter, Operation Halt III). We argue that three main features make these failed militarized fights in this period distinct. First, these operations were launched to fulfil the personal vow of President Akufo-Addo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), to fight and stop galamsey, even if it cost him the presidency. This is the first time, in the last three decades of democratic government in Ghana, a sitting Ghanaian president has publicly tied his political future to the fight against galamsey. Through this bold declaration, the president elevated galamsey to a national crisis of catastrophic proportions that threatens the very existence of the ecosystem of Ghana. Second, the blanket ban on ASM by the government of Ghana: both legal and illegal ASM was banned for over a year. This signalled an uncompromising stance of the government on the issue, further underscoring the president's commitment to combat and eradicate  galamsey. Third, unprecedented military operations: for the first time in Ghana’s recent democratic history, three successive military operations were rolled out within eight years to fight galamsey. These factors are crucial to our analysis of state capture. For example, the president, who is the  most powerful political officeholder, the highest politician through whom the state can be captured, was the one leading the war against galamsey. Also, the ban on ASM and the three successive military operations illustrated  the president’s determination to keep his vow. Yet, under his leadership the fight against galamsey failed. This failure is central to our argument, as it raises two poignant questions:  Why did the militarized fight against galamsey fail? And why did the president order the suspension of the military operations when the galamsey menace had aggravated? No official reasons were given for the suspensions. (But What). But what is indisputable is the inconsistency between the reasons for launching the operations and the suspension. We see this as evidence of state capture, which is often marked by internal contradictions, engendered by the symbiotic relationship between the formal state and the shadow state—with the latter feeding off the former.