This chapter summarises the main conclusions put forward in the book. Three main arguments are made. First, that British public opinion towards developments in European integration was relatively consistent in its nature. Second, although lacking the volatility frequently ascribed to it, changes in the public mood did occur—and where this was the case, public opinion shifted in a more eurosceptic direction. Third, party policies were frequently out of step with public opinion. Together, it is argued that these made Brexit more likely. However, based on their official policy positions supporting continued EU membership—and the particular visions for European integration that they had, Brexit was not something that either the Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat parties desired. The chapter argues that the main parties had opportunities to engage with the British public on matters European and to convince them of their visions for European integration. But these opportunities—discussed in the second half of the chapter—were not taken.

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Conclusion

  • Stuart Smedley

摘要

This chapter summarises the main conclusions put forward in the book. Three main arguments are made. First, that British public opinion towards developments in European integration was relatively consistent in its nature. Second, although lacking the volatility frequently ascribed to it, changes in the public mood did occur—and where this was the case, public opinion shifted in a more eurosceptic direction. Third, party policies were frequently out of step with public opinion. Together, it is argued that these made Brexit more likely. However, based on their official policy positions supporting continued EU membership—and the particular visions for European integration that they had, Brexit was not something that either the Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat parties desired. The chapter argues that the main parties had opportunities to engage with the British public on matters European and to convince them of their visions for European integration. But these opportunities—discussed in the second half of the chapter—were not taken.