This chapter discloses the waste and abuse by PICs in Abu Ghraib prison. After the 9/11 attacks, human intelligence gathered through the interrogation of suspects and captured terrorists became significant for the US military and intelligence agencies to find the perpetrators of the attacks. However, due to the overseas operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Armed Forces and intelligence agencies were in dire need of expert personnel to provide translation and interrogation services because of the increasing number of detainees. To meet these language requirements, the US government raised spending on the outsourcing of these tasks and hired vast numbers of PICs. The employment of a large number of private contractors widened the scope of PICs’ tasks, and contractors were also delegated to carry out interrogation tasks, which were mainly assumed to be a governmental function. The Bush administration cleared the way for the implementation of harsh interrogation techniques against detainees, and immunised contractors from Iraqi laws through CPA orders. In addition, the weak administrative monitoring of contractors in the Abu Ghraib prison, the impact of PICs on the contractual process and oversight system, and the lack of congressional patrolling led to excessive discretion being devolved to private contractors. These factors clearly created ideal conditions for the perpetration of terrible abuse and torture in the prison. Because their ownership of the management of interrogation tasks enabled them to control the contractual process, contractors had partly captured the system in Abu Ghraib. Although third parties such as the media and civilian and international organisations reacted to the abuse and torture when it was revealed, reactions mainly centred around the severity of the torture and there were inadequate fire-alarms to demonstrate the wide-ranging role of contractors in the Abu Ghraib case. As a response to the fire-alarms, the executive principal tried to downplay the abuse as a failure to monitor a few “bad apples”, and extended the contracts of the responsible companies. Congress had to deal with a turf war over the delegation of contractors to perform interrogation tasks. Although some reforms were achieved by Congress in legal systems such as the extension of the MEJA and UCMJ rules, they were limited to the DOD’s overseas operations.