This final chapter draws together the argument of The Road to War, highlighting how the combination of these models into a single framework provides a more comprehensive understanding of this decision process. The chapter explores the consequences of this argument, both for our understanding of the decision to invade Iraq and for the direction of FPA scholarship. The argument of The Road to War is situated within the literature on the decision to invade Iraq, showing how this argument challenges some (such as the “Oil War thesis”), but reinforces others (such as Blair’s pivotal role in taking the UK into the invasion of Iraq). The Chapter concludes by discussing the larger implications of the study and their relevance for future research. In policy terms, these cover how robust institutionalised balances within government are to assertive leaders; the need to sustain and process distinct inputs of information and expertise; and the dangers of policymaking by metaphor or analogy. In research terms, I address the conceptual implications for how FPA can better address the role of individual leaders, and the advantages of a “how?” and “why?” study to debates on ideational and strategic motivations behind major conflicts.