Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are a necessity to secure the physical devices connected to the Internet. The increasing use of devices with less memory, less computing resource and less power supply motivates the adoption of lightweight cryptography to provide security solution. Two AE schemes, TinyJambu and Elephant, are finalists of NIST lightweight cryptography competition. Another AE scheme, ACORN v3, a CAESAR competition finalist, has been shown to be particularly vulnerable against Differential Fault Attack (DFA), even more than its previous version ACORN v2. TinyJambu is also susceptible to DFA. An optimized interpolation attack has been proposed against one instance of Elephant, Delirium, recently. Methods are proposed to strengthen these schemes using the Cellular Automata (CA) and increase their resistance to these attacks. The Programmable Cellular Automata (PCA) 90–150 is effectively deployed to make these ciphers robust against DFA. The mathematical analysis of the invigorated schemes is also provided which shows that significant improvement is achieved in all the three enhanced schemes. ASCON is a finalist and GIMLI is a round 2 candidate of NIST lightweight cryptography competition. ASCON is a sponge function based authenticated encryption (AE) scheme suitable for high performance applications. It is suitable for use in environments like Internet of Things (IoT) where large number of very constrained devices communicate with high-end servers. The drawback is that fault analyses like Statistical Ineffective fault attack (SIFA) and Sub-Set Fault Analysis (SSFA) are possible. GIMLI is also a sponge function based AE scheme which is susceptible to SIFA. In this work, we modify ASCON 128a and GIMLI exploiting the pseudo-random properties of Cellular Automata (CA) to prevent these attacks. The analysis show that these attacks are inapplicable in the reinforced cipher.