If we look for concepts used by philosophers that relate to the maximum power principle, there is one that clearly stands out: Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power. It holds that all natural systems, both biotic and abiotic, develop in ways that increase their power. After his death in 1900, Nietzsche’s philosophy went on to have a substantial impact on twentieth and twenty-first century philosophy and cultures around the world. However, most of the philosophers that have reviewed his work have concluded that this interpretation of the will to power is empirically implausible. This chapter reviews Nietzsche’s description of the will to power and the argument he provides for it; it also illustrates how this concept plays a central role in Nietzsche’s critique of morality and then provides a unique interpretation of this critique. Over the past few decades, a number of philosophers have offered new and influential interpretations of Nietzsche’s critique of morality: some have argued that he uses the will to power as a fundamental moral value that has a privileged normative status; others have argued that the status of the will to power is not privileged in any way. It is just the perspective he chooses to use. This chapter argues that Nietzsche does not claim the moral values he analyzes are either immoral or moral, he describes these values as fostering or undermining the growth and flourishing of life as outlined by the will to power, understood as an empirical principle: his critique of morality comes from the perspective of science. The will to power is privileged because it is better able to explain natural phenomena than alternative theories. The interpretation of Nietzsche that emerges brings into relief the extent to which Odum’s critique of moral and religious values provides a model for Nietzsche’s critique of morality.