Leibniz endorses the world apart doctrine, according to which a substanceSubstance is that which is independent of all other things except GodGod. However, I will argue that in what appears to be a radical departure from the causal version of the world apart doctrineWorld apart doctrine, Du Châtelet—whose metaphysicsMetaphysics appears to be Leibnizian from a distance—embraces the causal connectedness of created substances. I further show that Du Châtelet’s rejection of Leibniz’s claim that a substance is causally independent of all other created substances can be traced back to a more fundamental anti-LeibnizianAnti-Leibnizian commitment on Du Châtelet’s part concerning the in-principle accessibility of naturalNatural (i.e., non-divine) sufficient reasons by finite minds and to her commitment to a causal theory of intentionality.