Both the elected leaders and the established administrations of European/international organisations enjoy legitimacy based on their respective roles and statuses. Incoming leaders invariably bring reform intentions to their offices, and these inevitably generate tensions with standing administrations jealous of their prerogatives, leading to tensions and potential stand-offs. This chapter examines different types of reforms and their origins. It considers administrations’ reactions to exogenous reform and the frequent tendency to seek accommodation with elected leadership. It further considers how the dividing line between the two layers remains vague and largely based on convention and is therefore vulnerable to erosion. It considers the informal ways in which administrations can seek to ‘defend the line’ and concludes that international organisations—including the European Union and its institutions—would do well to better codify respective responsibilities in tempore non suspecto. Ideally, both leaders and their administrations should enter into pacts with clearly established lines of responsibility and not rely on assumptions and unwritten conventions of the ‘good chaps’ sort.

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Reform-Related Conflictual Dynamics Between Democratic Political Legitimacy and Ethical Administrations in EU Institutions and International Organisations

  • Martin Westlake

摘要

Both the elected leaders and the established administrations of European/international organisations enjoy legitimacy based on their respective roles and statuses. Incoming leaders invariably bring reform intentions to their offices, and these inevitably generate tensions with standing administrations jealous of their prerogatives, leading to tensions and potential stand-offs. This chapter examines different types of reforms and their origins. It considers administrations’ reactions to exogenous reform and the frequent tendency to seek accommodation with elected leadership. It further considers how the dividing line between the two layers remains vague and largely based on convention and is therefore vulnerable to erosion. It considers the informal ways in which administrations can seek to ‘defend the line’ and concludes that international organisations—including the European Union and its institutions—would do well to better codify respective responsibilities in tempore non suspecto. Ideally, both leaders and their administrations should enter into pacts with clearly established lines of responsibility and not rely on assumptions and unwritten conventions of the ‘good chaps’ sort.