In classical DNSSEC, a drop-in replacement with quantum-safe cryptography would increase DNS query resolution times by at least a factor of \(2\times \) . Since a DNS response containing large post-quantum signatures is likely to get marked truncated (TC) by a nameserver (resulting in a wasted UDP round-trip), the client (here, the resolver) would have to retry its query over TCP, further incurring a minimum of two round-trips due to the three-way TCP handshake. We present \(\textsf{TurboDNS}\) : a backward-compatible protocol that eliminates two round-trips from the preceding flow by 1) sending TCP handshake data in the initial DNS/UDP flight itself, and 2) immediately streaming the DNS response over TCP after authenticating the client with a cryptographic cookie. Our experiments show that DNSSEC over \(\textsf{TurboDNS}\) , with either Falcon-512 or Dilithium-2 as the zone signing algorithm, is practically as fast as the currently deployed ECDSA P-256 and RSA-2048 setups in resolving QTYPE A DNS queries.