The fourth and final chapter is devoted to addressing important criticisms of Being and Time from Ernst Tugendhat and Michael Theunissen that have impeded a proper understanding of the relationship between fundamental ontology and critical theory, thereby clearing ground for a more fruitful dialogue between the two. In particular, I respond to claims that call into question the ethical and social-ontological viability of fundamental ontology. While Tugednhat focuses exclusively on the self-relation and Theunissen on social ontology, neither are able to bring both perspectives together, which the appropriative view accomplishes. As a result, the appropriative view avoids the long-standing charges of individualism, irrationalism, decisionism, and voluntarism. Finally, the chapter addresses an important ‘meta’ objection from Raymond Geuss that calls into question the very possibility of a quasi-transcendental, ontological approach to social criticism to vindicate the appropriative view as a viable approach to critical theory.