Building upon the interpretive framework and core commitments of fundamental ontology elaborated in the previous chapter, this chapter continues the sketch of the appropriative approach by focusing on crucial dimensions of selfhood in Division One of Being and Time, viz. understanding, interpretation, discourse/language, and attunement. In each case, the three modes—authentic, inauthentic, and undifferentiated—are clearly distinguished to make space for authenticity within the structure of everyday existence. Self-appropriation, moreover, is glossed as a hermeneutical and dialogical relation oriented toward applicable meaning that always already implies a relation to other and world. Hence, through a careful reading and reconstruction of Heidegger’s account of everydayness, it is possible to show not only that the sociality of the self does not condemn Dasein to inauthenticity a priori but also that it is not possible to adequately grasp Dasein’s existential possibilities without accounting for the kinds of social relations and environments or societies into which it is "‘thrown", i.e., whether they are authenticity- or inauthenticity-promoting. The fulfillment of the emancipatory aims of fundamental ontology, therefore, necessitates a return to concrete social reality.

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The Role of Attunement, Understanding, Discourse, and Falling in the Appropriative Self-Relation

  • Kurt C. M. Mertel

摘要

Building upon the interpretive framework and core commitments of fundamental ontology elaborated in the previous chapter, this chapter continues the sketch of the appropriative approach by focusing on crucial dimensions of selfhood in Division One of Being and Time, viz. understanding, interpretation, discourse/language, and attunement. In each case, the three modes—authentic, inauthentic, and undifferentiated—are clearly distinguished to make space for authenticity within the structure of everyday existence. Self-appropriation, moreover, is glossed as a hermeneutical and dialogical relation oriented toward applicable meaning that always already implies a relation to other and world. Hence, through a careful reading and reconstruction of Heidegger’s account of everydayness, it is possible to show not only that the sociality of the self does not condemn Dasein to inauthenticity a priori but also that it is not possible to adequately grasp Dasein’s existential possibilities without accounting for the kinds of social relations and environments or societies into which it is "‘thrown", i.e., whether they are authenticity- or inauthenticity-promoting. The fulfillment of the emancipatory aims of fundamental ontology, therefore, necessitates a return to concrete social reality.