Passwords are widely adopted for user authentication in practice, which led to the question of whether we can bootstrap a strongly-secure setting based on them. Historically, this has been extensively studied for key exchange; bootstrap from a low-entropy password to a high entropy key securing the communication. Other instances include digital lockers, signatures, secret sharing, and encryption. Motivated by a recent work on consumable tokens (Almashaqbeh et al., Eurocrypt 2022), we extend these efforts and investigate the unified notion of password-authenticated cryptography in which knowing a password allows executing cryptographic functionalities. Our model is resistant to exhaustive search attacks due to the self-destruction and unclonability properties of consumable tokens. We study two directions; the first is password-authenticated delegation of cryptographic capabilities in which a party can delegate her, e.g., signing or encryption/decryption, rights to another such that exercising the delegation requires knowing a password. The second direction is password-authenticated MPC, in which only participants who share the correct password can execute the MPC protocol. In both cases, an adversary who does not know the password can try a few guesses after which the functionality self-destructs. We formally define the notions above and build constructions realizing them. Our primary goal in this work is examining the power of consumable tokens in building password-authenticated cryptography in terms of viable constructions and supported adversary models, and thus, outlining open problems and potential future work directions.