This entry provides an overview of the main economic models of settlement and litigation decisions. Starting from the basic models, as developed by Landes (J Law Econ 14:61–108, 1971), Posner (J Leg Stud 2:399, 1973), and Gould (J Leg Stud, 279–300, 1973), we describe the evolution in literature toward the application of bargaining theory. Scholars, recognizing the existence of private information and strategic behavior, increasingly modeled the process of settlement negotiations.

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Litigation Decision

  • Samantha Bielen,
  • Wim Marneffe,
  • Wim Vereeck

摘要

This entry provides an overview of the main economic models of settlement and litigation decisions. Starting from the basic models, as developed by Landes (J Law Econ 14:61–108, 1971), Posner (J Leg Stud 2:399, 1973), and Gould (J Leg Stud, 279–300, 1973), we describe the evolution in literature toward the application of bargaining theory. Scholars, recognizing the existence of private information and strategic behavior, increasingly modeled the process of settlement negotiations.