The chapter concludes that the alternative, revisionary history of Deweyan pragmatism and analytic philosophy is flawed, in so far as there is nothing to suggest that analytic philosophers’ negative evaluation of Dewey’s philosophy is based on an engagement with it from the inside. The chapter also suggests that part of the reason why analytic philosophers have such a hard time understanding Dewey’s philosophy from the inside is metaphilosophical. More precisely, it argues that it is extremely difficult to understand Dewey’s philosophy if one subscribes to the idea that philosophy should provide rationally binding answers to general questions about man and reality. For Dewey’s philosophy is based on an explicit rejection of the sharp distinctions between, for example, fact and value and the subjective and the objective that such an approach presupposes. The chapter also suggests that analytic philosophers’ tendency to think of their own style as particularly clear, precise, and rigorous may have predisposed them to not engaging seriously with Dewey, whose style is very different from the standard analytic one, even though it possesses its own form of clarity and elegance. Finally, the chapter also points out that there are in fact analytic philosophers who have a positive view of Dewey’s philosophy and have managed to engage with it from the inside, and it ends by suggesting that this fact, together with the slow but gradual contextualization of analytic philosophy itself, points to a real potential for fruitful dialogue between analytic philosophy and Deweyan pragmatism.