The chapter analyzes Cheryl Misak’s critical engagement with Dewey’s thinking in her The American Pragmatists. The first part explains how she takes Dewey’s philosophy to be unable to make sense of genuine normativity because in a subjectivist way he was unwilling to recognize the existence of the external world in any robust sense. At the same time, it also describes how she thinks that he wanted to turn his back on philosophy in a revolutionary way instead of engaging seriously with the arguments of his opponents. The second part of the chapter assesses Misak’s critical analysis of Dewey’s thinking. It first points out that Dewey did not want to make sense of genuine normativity in Misak’s sense but instead tried to develop a way of thinking about the world that renders Misak’s question about genuine normativity redundant. It also suggests that Dewey would reject the distinction between the subjective and the objective that underlies Misak’s critique of his way of thinking about the external world since he takes this distinction itself to be the expression of a subjectivist phase in philosophy. Finally, the second part also argues that Dewey wanted to reconstruct philosophy rather than turn his back on it in a revolutionary way. The chapter concludes that Misak’s critique, despite her thorough knowledge of Dewey’s works, is predominantly externalistic, but also suggests that they actually share a common concern about the violent homogenization of local communities that may serve as a point of reference for future dialogues.

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Genuine Normativity, In-/Externality, and Revolutionary Reconstruction: Cheryl Misak Reads Dewey

  • Martin Ejsing Christensen

摘要

The chapter analyzes Cheryl Misak’s critical engagement with Dewey’s thinking in her The American Pragmatists. The first part explains how she takes Dewey’s philosophy to be unable to make sense of genuine normativity because in a subjectivist way he was unwilling to recognize the existence of the external world in any robust sense. At the same time, it also describes how she thinks that he wanted to turn his back on philosophy in a revolutionary way instead of engaging seriously with the arguments of his opponents. The second part of the chapter assesses Misak’s critical analysis of Dewey’s thinking. It first points out that Dewey did not want to make sense of genuine normativity in Misak’s sense but instead tried to develop a way of thinking about the world that renders Misak’s question about genuine normativity redundant. It also suggests that Dewey would reject the distinction between the subjective and the objective that underlies Misak’s critique of his way of thinking about the external world since he takes this distinction itself to be the expression of a subjectivist phase in philosophy. Finally, the second part also argues that Dewey wanted to reconstruct philosophy rather than turn his back on it in a revolutionary way. The chapter concludes that Misak’s critique, despite her thorough knowledge of Dewey’s works, is predominantly externalistic, but also suggests that they actually share a common concern about the violent homogenization of local communities that may serve as a point of reference for future dialogues.