The chapter analyzes May Brodbeck’s critical engagement with Dewey’s thinking in her 1963 paper “The Philosophy of John Dewey.” The chapter first situates Brodbeck within the history of analytic philosophy and then goes on to explicate her critical analysis of Dewey’s thinking about inquiry. Here, the chapter points out how Brodbeck admits that there are elements of genuine empiricism in Dewey’s thinking but ends up concluding that it represents a deeply problematic form of rationalism that thinks the purpose of science is to deliver analytically true universal propositions. In addition, the first part of the chapter also points out how she not only takes Dewey’s focus on the process of inquiry to lead to the subjectivization of both facts and values but also thinks that his philosophy served as a means of ideological transition within American society. The second part of the chapter argues that Brodbeck, despite having a solid grasp of the basic features of Dewey’s theory of inquiry, has completely misunderstood Dewey’s conception of the goal of inquiry because she projects her own conception of analyticity and dualistic distinction between the empirical and the rational onto Dewey’s thinking about inquiry. At the same time, it also argues that the claim of subjectivization is based on a distinction between the subjective and the objective that Dewey would reject, and the chapter concludes that her idea of an ideological transition is untenable. The chapter ends by suggesting that they actually share a common concern about the evil consequences of modern science that might serve as a starting point for a more fruitful dialogue than Brodbeck’s externalist and reductive analysis.