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I outline three criticisms of DSM psychiatric diagnoses. Firstly, they do not describe real entities, secondly, they are the product of a decision making process and thirdly they miss out important information about people. These concerns are often driven by seeing science as being about describing mind-independent entities. Since DSM psychiatric diagnoses do not describe mind-independent entities they are not scientifically legitimate. In contrast, in this book I outline a view of science as being about describing reality as we can experience it. Doing this means categorical psychiatric diagnoses can be scientifically legitimate despite not describing mind-independent entities.

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Introduction

  • 章节

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Sam Fellowes

摘要

I outline three criticisms of DSM psychiatric diagnoses. Firstly, they do not describe real entities, secondly, they are the product of a decision making process and thirdly they miss out important information about people. These concerns are often driven by seeing science as being about describing mind-independent entities. Since DSM psychiatric diagnoses do not describe mind-independent entities they are not scientifically legitimate. In contrast, in this book I outline a view of science as being about describing reality as we can experience it. Doing this means categorical psychiatric diagnoses can be scientifically legitimate despite not describing mind-independent entities.