The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has marked an era of assertation of Russian nationalism and expansionist foreign policy ambitions. Presidential addresses and media discourses intensified the polarised tones constructing a number of internal or external others of the Russian national self. This chapter explores how the representations and the discursive construction of the Russian nation and its external or internal others or foes have been communicated before and during the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Jan-June 2022). The discursive production of two media outlets belonging to “entrepreneurs of influence” are assessed: Konstantin Malofeev’s online television Tsargrad and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s RIA-FAN (part of the Patriot Media Group). This comparative chapter applies discourse-historical analysis (DHA) to assess how othering is communicated in times of war through the lenses of discursive theories of nationalism. The findings demonstrate that a meta-discourse about achieving a multi-polar international system marks a range of external others, such as the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, liberal Europe, the European Union, and Ukraine, among others. Russophobia is a key discursive theme pervasive in both channels to communicate a wide range of foes and is selectively applied across cases. Both RIA-FAN and Tsargrad frame Ukraine in terms of territory rather than as a sovereign state and align themselves with the dominant Kremlin narratives that motivate the invasion. Lastly, a range of internal others is salient across the actors’ publications, such as Russian liberals or opposition, anti-war public figures, other oligarchs, immigrants from Central Asia, or separatists.