The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has attempted to retain its autonomy when interpreting EU law. Thereby, declaring many of the dispute settlement mechanisms established through international agreements concluded by the EU and third countries as not compatible with the treaties. This ‘autonomy principle’ has clearly threatened future agreements with the EU and third countries including the UK. This chapter will firstly assess the CJEU’s historical stance on maintaining its exclusive competence concerning the interpretation of EU law. The discussion will then proceed to acknowledge that the EU has made attempts to avoid isolation on the global level and made some concessions to this rule by for example by utilising the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Court as a mode of dispute resolution albeit with restrictions. Furthermore, the conflict resolution provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Windsor Framework are examined focussing on the procedural aspects of the currency of CJEU within the WA. Finally, the dispute resolution provisions of the Trade and Corporation Agreement (TCA) are evaluated. The findings demonstrate that the WA allows for the judicial intervention from the CJEU, relying on an intergovernmental approach based on mutual consent and arbitration. In contrast to the TCA’s heavy reliance on alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for dispute resolution and no real role for the CJEU.