The Chinese tradition has often been characterized by its critical view of the law and its role in social ordering. Among philosophical approaches commonly associated with skepticism toward legal tools for maintaining social order, Confucianism stands out as particularly intriguing. This paper aims to reconstruct and present the core Confucian perspective on the limits of the law. As will be demonstrated, Confucians regard the law as a rudimentary tool for achieving social values. While they acknowledge that the law can offer marginal benefits for maintaining order, they ultimately view it as a subsidiary mechanism, heavily reliant on more fundamental ordering processes. Notably, Confucian thought portrays the law as an external instrument, incapable of achieving the Confucian ideal of harmonization. This paper explores the key arguments advanced by Confucians against legal ordering, including the axiological alienation of law, the one-sidedness of law, and the law’s inadequacy in cultivating essential skills and virtues.