The struggle that has gone down in history as the Battle of the Atlantic began modestly, with U-Boats operating in the shipping lanes leading to the main ports of Britain’s west coast. When the Admiralty created a new naval command, Western Approaches, its activity made attacks in these areas too risky for submarines. When the British established an effective convoy system off the west coast, the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (BdU) responded by pushing back to the west zone where his ‘grey wolves’ waited for the spoils. The Royal Navy was forced to escort ships between British ports and 20, 30, and finally 40° W. A convoy going out towards the ports of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland would follow in the company of an escort to a certain point in the western longitude, where the escort group would take charge of the convoy sailing in the opposite direction. The escort functioned similarly on the other side of the ocean, where the Canadian Navy would take care of a convoy leaving for the UK on a dangerous initial leg of the route, allowing it to sail unescorted in the open ocean until it encountered a British escort group. However, in May 1941, convoy HX126 was attacked at 41° W, as far west as any before it. The move of the U-boots into the open ocean forced the Royal and the Canadian Navies to eliminate the mid-ocean gap and escort ships all the way. From then on, ships of the Newfoundland Escort Force Command, mainly Royal Canadian Navy, accompanied the convoys heading east to a point known as MOMP (Mid-Ocean Meeting Point), located at 35° W, where escort groups based in Iceland took charge. These in turn escorted the convoy to EOMP (Eastern Ocean Meeting Point, 18° W), where Western Approaches took over. In addition to the surface escorts, the ocean was patrolled by aircraft of both parties. The German submariners were most likely to operate in the eastern Atlantic, where they could expect support from Condor aircraft taking off from bases in France. The U-boot captains claimed that fighting the convoy escorts and torpedoing the ships was the easier part of the job. The problem was finding a convoy in the vastness of the ocean—a report from a patrolling aircraft was the solution. However, where Condors reached, British aircraft also patrolled, and, taking off from bases in Newfoundland and Iceland, they covered most of the convoy route. The range of aircraft available to the Coastal Command at the time allowed continuous patrols to cover waters within about 400 miles of base and incidental patrols within 400–600 miles. In October 1941, a report was prepared for the Admiralty, according to which more than half of the ships lost in September fell victim to U-Boots outside the area of permanent air patrols, and the remainder in an area where aircraft appeared sporadically; no ship was lost in the area covered by continuous air cover. The facts dictated a solution—air cover had to be provided for the convoys along the entire route. The Allies did not have at the moment aircraft with sufficient range to provide air patrols over the central part of the convoy route. The area in the mid-Atlantic was referred to as the Black Pit, and its waters were gradually turning into the largest graveyard of ships in the world’s seas.

The Black Pit

章节
发表日期：

2025年

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Marek Grajek

摘要

The struggle that has gone down in history as the Battle of the Atlantic began modestly, with U-Boats operating in the shipping lanes leading to the main ports of Britain’s west coast. When the Admiralty created a new naval command, Western Approaches, its activity made attacks in these areas too risky for submarines. When the British established an effective convoy system off the west coast, the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (BdU) responded by pushing back to the west zone where his ‘grey wolves’ waited for the spoils. The Royal Navy was forced to escort ships between British ports and 20, 30, and finally 40° W. A convoy going out towards the ports of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland would follow in the company of an escort to a certain point in the western longitude, where the escort group would take charge of the convoy sailing in the opposite direction. The escort functioned similarly on the other side of the ocean, where the Canadian Navy would take care of a convoy leaving for the UK on a dangerous initial leg of the route, allowing it to sail unescorted in the open ocean until it encountered a British escort group. However, in May 1941, convoy HX126 was attacked at 41° W, as far west as any before it. The move of the U-boots into the open ocean forced the Royal and the Canadian Navies to eliminate the mid-ocean gap and escort ships all the way. From then on, ships of the Newfoundland Escort Force Command, mainly Royal Canadian Navy, accompanied the convoys heading east to a point known as MOMP (Mid-Ocean Meeting Point), located at 35° W, where escort groups based in Iceland took charge. These in turn escorted the convoy to EOMP (Eastern Ocean Meeting Point, 18° W), where Western Approaches took over. In addition to the surface escorts, the ocean was patrolled by aircraft of both parties. The German submariners were most likely to operate in the eastern Atlantic, where they could expect support from Condor aircraft taking off from bases in France. The U-boot captains claimed that fighting the convoy escorts and torpedoing the ships was the easier part of the job. The problem was finding a convoy in the vastness of the ocean—a report from a patrolling aircraft was the solution. However, where Condors reached, British aircraft also patrolled, and, taking off from bases in Newfoundland and Iceland, they covered most of the convoy route. The range of aircraft available to the Coastal Command at the time allowed continuous patrols to cover waters within about 400 miles of base and incidental patrols within 400–600 miles. In October 1941, a report was prepared for the Admiralty, according to which more than half of the ships lost in September fell victim to U-Boots outside the area of permanent air patrols, and the remainder in an area where aircraft appeared sporadically; no ship was lost in the area covered by continuous air cover. The facts dictated a solution—air cover had to be provided for the convoys along the entire route. The Allies did not have at the moment aircraft with sufficient range to provide air patrols over the central part of the convoy route. The area in the mid-Atlantic was referred to as the Black Pit, and its waters were gradually turning into the largest graveyard of ships in the world’s seas.