Despite a renaissance spawned by Žižek’s brief fascination with Schelling almost three decades ago and Iain Hamilton Grant’s book on Schelling over one decade ago, contemporary continental philosophy is still only beginning to come to terms with its debt to Schelling. This chapter will focus on Schelling’s contributions to what is currently à la mode in continental philosophy: speculative realism and new realism. Before presenting affinities and critical divergences between Schelling and contemporary realist trends, I will first rebuff the assumption that Schelling could not possibly have anything positive to offer realism because he was, of course, a German Idealist. Section 1 thus provides criteria for demarcating realism from non-realism, principally the thesis that there is not being because there is thinking or intelligibility, but vice versa. In Sect. 2, I show how Schelling’s realism stemmed from his confrontation with Kant’s transcendental idealism. This is significant because those associated with speculative and new realist movements normally share, if nothing else, the tendency to be critical of transcendentalism, where transcendentalism ranges from Kant’s idealism to Husserl’s phenomenology to Heidegger’s insistence in Being and Time that there is only being (Sein) because there is Dasein (Heidegger’s term of art for human existence, literally meaning “being-there”). In Sect. 3, I suggest an alternative, that is, non-German lineage of robust realism in France, transmitted from Schelling through French spiritualism (Émile Boutroux, Maine de Biran, and Félix Ravaisson) and Henri Bergson to the speculative, “post-transcendental” ontologies of the later Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Gilles Deleuze. I conclude in Sect. 4 by indicating why contemporary realism must be “speculative” or non-transcendental, at least in the traditional sense, which ensures that it cannot but be Schellingian in spirit.