Most F. W. J. Schelling scholars believe that Schelling is not a political philosopher. Indeed, unlike G. W. F. Hegel, Schelling never composed a treatise on the philosophy of right; and, once again unlike Hegel, Schelling never understood the modern state as the objective manifestation of Absolute Spirit. If Hegel’s political philosophy is based upon an immanent metaphysics of history, which Hegel himself takes as “philosophy of history” in the guise of a theodicy, then the “absence” of such theodicy would imply (so it is claimed) that there is a lack of political philosophy in Schelling’s work. To come to terms with why Schelling’s alleged “failure” in this regard fascinates us today more than Hegel’s success, it is imperative that we do not take the benchmark against “political philosophy” is to be measured from what Hegel himself defines it to be, namely, theodicy. For it is precisely in opposition to this theodicy of history through which an apology for the world is worked out systematically by Hegel—a secularized version of the theodicy of history realized by the “cunning of Reason”—that Schelling evokes an eschatological vision of history in a Pauline spirit. This vision of history, which anticipates both Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s critique of historical Reason, consists in an eschatological reserve regarding any possible objective manifestation of the absolute at the level of world-historical politics. I shall call this Schellingian conception of history, to borrow a phrase from Gerard Bensussan, “a negative politics.” In other words, this eschatological reserve constitutes Schelling’s negative politics because it entails that the very meaning of “politics” itself is at stake and is to be thought anew, outside any possible theodicy of history. Consequently, we will then see a different and heterogeneous sense of “the political” emerging out of Schelling: a political eschatology as negative politics.