Since the enactment of the AUKUS Arrangement in 2021, the proponents of AUKUS – the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia – have been undertaking a drastic re-engagement with their agendas of conducting of research in the national interest. Yet the historical independence of many research institutions has been modified by geopolitics, with these institutions collaborating more or less frequently with arms of government depending on concerns of national security. Further, the commonality of research partnerships with overseas individuals and entities – still absolutely crucial to the development of diversity in opinions and views – is being challenged in the face of subordination, manipulation or interference by malicious actors. AUKUS has thus seen the evolution and expansion of legal controls into the domains of higher education research: foreign investment reviews, sanctions and export controls, and visa restrictions on overseas students and professors. This practice of “research security” has gained significant traction across a number of jurisdictions over the last decade as a measure of securitizing university research against national security threats. The language of these controls largely reflects the emergence of geopolitics as an existential threat: according to the policy basis of those controls imposed by States, universities are no longer safe to engage in the frank, open and collaborative inquiry that has personified their existence for centuries. One recent trend has been the emergence of, or uptick in, the use of economic sanctions and controls to limit engagements or partnerships between universities and foreign entities on research security grounds. However, the precise contours of what constitutes appropriate and responsible research security controls in the higher education environment remain simultaneously contested and poorly explored. This paper will thus focus on examining the current research security regimes of the US, UK and Australia, with particular emphasis on the use of national security and economic controls to shape collaborations in high-tech research. The paper will argue for the proper place of such controls typified in regimes of law and policy, as well as exploring the utility and drawbacks associated with the use of law versus policy in the institution of research security controls. It will also develop several key lessons that could be learned by other jurisdictions as they confront the shifting dynamic of global economic competition.