<p>Recent studies following Milgram’s seminal experiment have provided insights into what neural, psychological, and contextual factors influence disobedience to immoral orders. According to the engaged followership model, greater identification with the experimenter leads to greater obedience. However, such results were not always replicated. It remains unclear how identifying with the person giving orders modulates (dis)obedience and related mechanisms. Therefore, the current study focussed on neurocognitive mechanisms and cultural factors related to identification with the experimenter to explain one’s decision to (dis)obey. We investigated an ecologically valid paradigm wherein participants received orders from the experimenter to send real, mildly painful shocks to a victim. Participants were divided into Low or High identification groups via a median-split on their experimenter identification scores. The results showed that identification with the experimenter did not influence prosocial disobedience (i.e., refusing to obey the orders to send a shock) rate or the neural conflict markers (midfrontal-theta activity), but it modulated the implicit sense of agency (SoA). Participants in the Low identification group showed greater temporal binding effect (more SoA) when disobeying harmful orders than when obeying to shock, whereas this effect was not observed amongst those who identified more with the experimenter. Exploratory analyses revealed that prosocial disobedience was associated with multiple factors: responsibility rating, Right-wing Authoritarianism, and moral-foundation subscale (Authority/Respect). These findings highlight that prosocial disobedience may emerge from an interplay of cognitive processes and sociocultural values rather than from identification with the experimenter alone, indicating the need to study (dis)obedience with a pluralistic approach.</p>