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<p>Cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) would break widely deployed public-key cryptography (RSA/ECC) via Shor’s algorithm, enabling retroactive decryption of captured ciphertext (“harvest now, decrypt later”). This paper presents an enterprise-cloud transition framework that couples (i) standards-based algorithm selection using NIST’s post-quantum standards (FIPS&#xa0;203–205), (ii) a cloud threat model that distinguishes retroactive confidentiality loss from forward integrity/authentication risks, and (iii) a quantitative timing-risk model grounded in Mosca’s inequality. Using a public expert-elicitation distribution for Q-day timing and a reproducible Monte Carlo estimator, we compare migration strategies and key planning parameters (migration start year, migration duration, and confidentiality lifetime). We also contrast this probabilistic view with common deterministic single-date Q-day planning, highlighting how tail uncertainty can materially change exposure estimates and recommended start years. For a representative enterprise case (<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(X{=}10\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi>X</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>10</mn> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> years, <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(Y{=}6\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi>Y</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>6</mn> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> years), delaying the migration start from 2026 to 2030 increases the expected exposed fraction of the confidentiality window from 0.37 to 0.54 under a midline timeline. We also provide cloud-specific implementation guidance (crypto inventory, hybrid TLS/QUIC and service-mesh deployments, PKI readiness, and governance), and summarize performance and interoperability drivers arising from larger post-quantum key material.</p>

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Post-quantum readiness and cryptographic transition planning for enterprise cloud

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月3日

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  • Ankit Gupta,
  • Shilpi Mittal

摘要

Cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) would break widely deployed public-key cryptography (RSA/ECC) via Shor’s algorithm, enabling retroactive decryption of captured ciphertext (“harvest now, decrypt later”). This paper presents an enterprise-cloud transition framework that couples (i) standards-based algorithm selection using NIST’s post-quantum standards (FIPS 203–205), (ii) a cloud threat model that distinguishes retroactive confidentiality loss from forward integrity/authentication risks, and (iii) a quantitative timing-risk model grounded in Mosca’s inequality. Using a public expert-elicitation distribution for Q-day timing and a reproducible Monte Carlo estimator, we compare migration strategies and key planning parameters (migration start year, migration duration, and confidentiality lifetime). We also contrast this probabilistic view with common deterministic single-date Q-day planning, highlighting how tail uncertainty can materially change exposure estimates and recommended start years. For a representative enterprise case ( \(X{=}10\) X = 10 years, \(Y{=}6\) Y = 6 years), delaying the migration start from 2026 to 2030 increases the expected exposed fraction of the confidentiality window from 0.37 to 0.54 under a midline timeline. We also provide cloud-specific implementation guidance (crypto inventory, hybrid TLS/QUIC and service-mesh deployments, PKI readiness, and governance), and summarize performance and interoperability drivers arising from larger post-quantum key material.