Migrant remittances and the decline of presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa
摘要
This paper examines how remittance dependence relates to public support for the abolition of presidential term limits in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region where electoral turnovers are rare and incumbents often manipulate restrictions on the permitted length of stay in office to prolong their rule. It is theorized that citizens who depend heavily on migrant remittances are more likely to support the removal of said limits. This preference is driven by the desire to protect their assets amid actual or anticipated conflict and instability. Using Afrobarometer data, the analysis confirms that remittance-dependent individuals are significantly more likely to back the removal of presidential term limits compared to those less dependent hereon. Consistent with expectations, this relationship becomes stronger among those who fear conflict or have prior experience with it. Falsification tests additionally corroborate the theorized mechanism’s validity. Migrant remittances, frequently hailed as a force for democratization, are associated with diminished prospects of political alternation and with stronger risk-averse preferences against disruption of status quo among those dependent on them. Provided, as such, is evidence of a nuanced relationship existing between remittances and compliance with democratic norms in origin countries in SSA.