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Abstract <p>Article reviews the estimates of the Soviet military and political elites on the security menaces and balance of power during the period of international turbulence in Europe after World War I. Especially, author seeks to explore how the Soviet leadership perceived the interconnection between the strategic situation in Eastern and Western Europe. The article analyzes three strategic scenarios, which were presented in the Kremlin’s “mental map”: first, the Soviet–German convergent pressure on Poland; second, Franco-Polish strike against Germany; and finally, the formation of the wide-scale anti-Soviet “front” including Germany, France, and Great Britain.</p>

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Indivisible Security: Soviet Strategy and Balance of Power in Eastern and Western Europe (1920–1925)

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月22日

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  • I. Magadeev

摘要

Abstract

Article reviews the estimates of the Soviet military and political elites on the security menaces and balance of power during the period of international turbulence in Europe after World War I. Especially, author seeks to explore how the Soviet leadership perceived the interconnection between the strategic situation in Eastern and Western Europe. The article analyzes three strategic scenarios, which were presented in the Kremlin’s “mental map”: first, the Soviet–German convergent pressure on Poland; second, Franco-Polish strike against Germany; and finally, the formation of the wide-scale anti-Soviet “front” including Germany, France, and Great Britain.