<p>Are public sector workers more honest? Although an important question in public administration and the policy sciences, empirical results have been inconclusive. Current studies have largely relied on indirect methods, conducted with aspiring public sector workers rather than those already in the sector. This paper presents the results of one of the first direct, empirical field experiment among 2983 public sector workers in the United States, using a dice-roll experiment. The findings were then contrasted with an earlier dice-roll experiment among the US general population. We find that public sector workers indeed behaved more honestly when unmonitored compared to the general population. Given a choice, a large majority of public sector workers chose to be monitored, and as a result were even more honest, a finding similar to the study conducted in the general population. Significantly, after opting to be monitored, there was no difference in honesty levels between sectors, showing that a simple intervention can negate the initial difference between public workers and general populace. Public sector workers also perceived other public sector workers as being more honest than themselves.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Nudging our better angels: are public sector workers more honest?

  • Ching Leong

摘要

Are public sector workers more honest? Although an important question in public administration and the policy sciences, empirical results have been inconclusive. Current studies have largely relied on indirect methods, conducted with aspiring public sector workers rather than those already in the sector. This paper presents the results of one of the first direct, empirical field experiment among 2983 public sector workers in the United States, using a dice-roll experiment. The findings were then contrasted with an earlier dice-roll experiment among the US general population. We find that public sector workers indeed behaved more honestly when unmonitored compared to the general population. Given a choice, a large majority of public sector workers chose to be monitored, and as a result were even more honest, a finding similar to the study conducted in the general population. Significantly, after opting to be monitored, there was no difference in honesty levels between sectors, showing that a simple intervention can negate the initial difference between public workers and general populace. Public sector workers also perceived other public sector workers as being more honest than themselves.