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<p>This study investigates stakeholder cooperation in the environmental governance of a public-good recreational vehicle campsite, combining evolutionary game theory with complex network simulations under two incentive scenarios. The results show that (1) the initial stakeholder network exhibits small-world characteristics, enabling efficient information exchange. (2) Under the basic cooperation scenario, full collaboration is only achievable when perceived benefits and investment returns are very high. (3) In contrast, the benefit-redistribution scenario demonstrates that introducing a moderate collective-action threshold enables full cooperation even with significantly lower individual incentives. And (4) sensitivity analysis confirms that cooperation density undergoes a discontinuous phase transition depending on the threshold level and redistribution intensity. Accordingly, policymakers should implement institutional mechanisms that establish clear contribution thresholds and reward participation through structured benefit-sharing, effectively transforming passive stakeholders into active co-governors.</p>

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Collaborative dynamics in recreational vehicle campsite management: an evolutionary game and complex network analysis of stakeholders’ engagement

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月31日

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  • Xiumei XU,
  • Ling LUO

摘要

This study investigates stakeholder cooperation in the environmental governance of a public-good recreational vehicle campsite, combining evolutionary game theory with complex network simulations under two incentive scenarios. The results show that (1) the initial stakeholder network exhibits small-world characteristics, enabling efficient information exchange. (2) Under the basic cooperation scenario, full collaboration is only achievable when perceived benefits and investment returns are very high. (3) In contrast, the benefit-redistribution scenario demonstrates that introducing a moderate collective-action threshold enables full cooperation even with significantly lower individual incentives. And (4) sensitivity analysis confirms that cooperation density undergoes a discontinuous phase transition depending on the threshold level and redistribution intensity. Accordingly, policymakers should implement institutional mechanisms that establish clear contribution thresholds and reward participation through structured benefit-sharing, effectively transforming passive stakeholders into active co-governors.