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<p>Why do governments ratify international human rights treaties, and why do ratification patterns differ across regime types? Existing research emphasizes domestic institutions, but states’ commitments also cluster across countries, suggesting diffusion dynamics. This article argues that governments learn not only from peer ratification but also from the political consequences that follow. I develop a theory of survival-contingent learning, which predicts that authoritarian regimes are particularly attentive to post-ratification instability in politically similar states. Using a time-series cross-sectional event history analysis of 36 multilateral human rights treaties from 1945 to 2016, the study finds that peer ratification increases treaty commitment across regime types. However, authoritarian regimes become less likely to ratify when similarly governed peers experience post-ratification political crises. This deterrent effect is concentrated in politically consequential domains, especially civil and political rights and physical integrity treaties.</p>

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Survival-contingent learning and the diffusion of human rights treaty ratification

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月24日

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  • Ki Eun Ryu

摘要

Why do governments ratify international human rights treaties, and why do ratification patterns differ across regime types? Existing research emphasizes domestic institutions, but states’ commitments also cluster across countries, suggesting diffusion dynamics. This article argues that governments learn not only from peer ratification but also from the political consequences that follow. I develop a theory of survival-contingent learning, which predicts that authoritarian regimes are particularly attentive to post-ratification instability in politically similar states. Using a time-series cross-sectional event history analysis of 36 multilateral human rights treaties from 1945 to 2016, the study finds that peer ratification increases treaty commitment across regime types. However, authoritarian regimes become less likely to ratify when similarly governed peers experience post-ratification political crises. This deterrent effect is concentrated in politically consequential domains, especially civil and political rights and physical integrity treaties.