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<p>Conventional theories of postwar peace emphasize inclusion, negotiation, and institutional reform, yet the persistence of stability in authoritarian contexts demands alternative explanations. This paper examines how the Russian Federation achieved durable postwar stability in Chechnya through <i>Delegated Coercive Governance</i> (DCG), a model of authoritarian peacebuilding based on the strategic delegation of coercive, administrative, and symbolic authority to a loyal local proxy. Challenging liberal peace theories that associate stability with inclusivity and institutional reform, the Chechenization model demonstrates how autocratic regimes secure order through coercive delegation and exclusionary governance. DCG functions through three interrelated mechanisms: delegated violence, patronage-based stabilization, and micro-level coercive control. Using process-tracing within a single-case design, the study shows how these mechanisms produced Chechnya’s quasi-autonomous “internal foreign” status, a stable yet deeply illiberal political order. The findings reveal that authoritarian peace can be maintained not through consent or legitimacy, but through institutionalized fear, dependency, and hierarchical control, offering a theoretical framework for understanding how coercive delegation enables durable yet fragile post-conflict stability in authoritarian regimes.</p>

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Authoritarian peace through delegated coercion: the Chechenization model in Russia’s counterinsurgency

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月8日

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  • Jithin Raveendran

摘要

Conventional theories of postwar peace emphasize inclusion, negotiation, and institutional reform, yet the persistence of stability in authoritarian contexts demands alternative explanations. This paper examines how the Russian Federation achieved durable postwar stability in Chechnya through Delegated Coercive Governance (DCG), a model of authoritarian peacebuilding based on the strategic delegation of coercive, administrative, and symbolic authority to a loyal local proxy. Challenging liberal peace theories that associate stability with inclusivity and institutional reform, the Chechenization model demonstrates how autocratic regimes secure order through coercive delegation and exclusionary governance. DCG functions through three interrelated mechanisms: delegated violence, patronage-based stabilization, and micro-level coercive control. Using process-tracing within a single-case design, the study shows how these mechanisms produced Chechnya’s quasi-autonomous “internal foreign” status, a stable yet deeply illiberal political order. The findings reveal that authoritarian peace can be maintained not through consent or legitimacy, but through institutionalized fear, dependency, and hierarchical control, offering a theoretical framework for understanding how coercive delegation enables durable yet fragile post-conflict stability in authoritarian regimes.