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<p>The international system does not consistently favor either balancing or power maximization. Instead, state behavior is shaped by relative power positions and state perceptions of these positions. This paper introduces the concept of “Passive Advantage Theory” to explain how states’ expectations of future power gains influence their strategic choices. Applying this framework to analyze Germany’s behavior from 1871 to 1914, the paper explores how passive advantages influenced Germany’s transition from constrained status quo policies to expansionist Weltpolitik. The theory posits that states seek to enhance their power through the most efficient and secure means available, with passive advantages providing pathways for power growth that minimize the risk of triggering balancing coalitions. This paper finds that the utilization of passive advantages to increase relative power represents a crucial mechanism by which security-seeking states transition to revisionist policies. Additionally, for states possessing significant passive advantages, decisions regarding war and expansion are closely tied to expectations about preserving, losing, or gaining these advantages.</p>

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Bide the time and wait to win: passive advantage theory and Germany’s rise and fall, 1871–1914

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月1日

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  • Di Lu

摘要

The international system does not consistently favor either balancing or power maximization. Instead, state behavior is shaped by relative power positions and state perceptions of these positions. This paper introduces the concept of “Passive Advantage Theory” to explain how states’ expectations of future power gains influence their strategic choices. Applying this framework to analyze Germany’s behavior from 1871 to 1914, the paper explores how passive advantages influenced Germany’s transition from constrained status quo policies to expansionist Weltpolitik. The theory posits that states seek to enhance their power through the most efficient and secure means available, with passive advantages providing pathways for power growth that minimize the risk of triggering balancing coalitions. This paper finds that the utilization of passive advantages to increase relative power represents a crucial mechanism by which security-seeking states transition to revisionist policies. Additionally, for states possessing significant passive advantages, decisions regarding war and expansion are closely tied to expectations about preserving, losing, or gaining these advantages.