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<p>The limited liability agreement makes it possible to align corporate and business guidelines by reducing asymmetries and conflicts between the principals of a company. This article analyses the relationship between limited liability agreements as an internal corporate governance mechanism. Through an experiment, five scenarios were developed to describe the influence of information asymmetries in the composition of a limited liability agreement. Analysis of variance was subsequently applied for statistical tests. As a result, this study identifies the relationship between existing asymmetries between partners, and which clauses tend to be positive in a limited liability agreement when there are (no) asymmetries between the principals. Information asymmetry altered the perception of need within the construction of an agreement between partners in most tested clauses. The study presents innovativeness as it performs an analysis of an internal corporate governance mechanism for limited liability companies, capable of regulating principal-principal relationships.</p>

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The weight of hidden information: experimental insights into asymmetric information in limited liability agreements

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月17日

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  • Vinícius Castanho Kleinert,
  • Raul Beal Partyka,
  • Eleandra Maria Prigol Meneghini,
  • Jeferson Lana,
  • Rosilene Marcon

摘要

The limited liability agreement makes it possible to align corporate and business guidelines by reducing asymmetries and conflicts between the principals of a company. This article analyses the relationship between limited liability agreements as an internal corporate governance mechanism. Through an experiment, five scenarios were developed to describe the influence of information asymmetries in the composition of a limited liability agreement. Analysis of variance was subsequently applied for statistical tests. As a result, this study identifies the relationship between existing asymmetries between partners, and which clauses tend to be positive in a limited liability agreement when there are (no) asymmetries between the principals. Information asymmetry altered the perception of need within the construction of an agreement between partners in most tested clauses. The study presents innovativeness as it performs an analysis of an internal corporate governance mechanism for limited liability companies, capable of regulating principal-principal relationships.