Scholarlink

<p>When might interest groups normally lobbying the top level of government choose to lobby lower levels? Little research focuses on this kind of multivenue lobbying, so in this paper I study patterns of national group advocacy in the American states using data from 2006 to 2020. While it is rare for national groups to lobby state governments, some do. Why? My explanation draws on the idea that sometimes national groups <i>need</i> to lobby when opportunities present themselves coupled with their <i>ability</i> to lobby. I find that it is business-oriented associations that are more likely to lobby than cause-oriented citizen groups, but that advocacy resources are also an important motivator as is federal spending in the states or high levels of state corporate taxation. While the partisan leanings of state lawmakers do not matter much, party polarization does, with all national groups more likely to lobby a polarized state legislature.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

The strategic choice of national interest groups to lobby in the American states

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月22日

查看全文
  • Thomas T. Holyoke

摘要

When might interest groups normally lobbying the top level of government choose to lobby lower levels? Little research focuses on this kind of multivenue lobbying, so in this paper I study patterns of national group advocacy in the American states using data from 2006 to 2020. While it is rare for national groups to lobby state governments, some do. Why? My explanation draws on the idea that sometimes national groups need to lobby when opportunities present themselves coupled with their ability to lobby. I find that it is business-oriented associations that are more likely to lobby than cause-oriented citizen groups, but that advocacy resources are also an important motivator as is federal spending in the states or high levels of state corporate taxation. While the partisan leanings of state lawmakers do not matter much, party polarization does, with all national groups more likely to lobby a polarized state legislature.