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<p>When do federal governments listen to local governments? Although local government associations (LGAs) are among the most important lobbying actors in modern democracies, we still know very little about when and why LGAs can shape federal decision-making according to their preferences. Addressing this research gap, this article investigates the conditions for lobbying success of LGAs in the German Bundestag during the 19th legislative period (2017–2021). Applying the main explanatory factors for lobbying success from the literature on business and public interest groups to LGAs, this article argues that intergovernmental lobbying success can be explained by actor- and issue-level characteristics. The research hypotheses are tested using a novel dataset of 555 legislative requests from LGAs to 87 bills discussed in the public hearings of the Bundestag’s standing committees. Logistic regression analyses reveal that LGAs are more likely to attain their preferences if a) their requests are to preserve the status quo, b) they form a unified lobbying coalition, c) they submit a larger amount of technical information, d) their requests are supported by the Bundesrat, and e) they lobby on less complex bills. In sum, the findings enhance our understanding of local interest representation in federal systems.</p>

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When local governments win (and when they lose): conditions for successful intergovernmental lobbying in Germany

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月22日

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  • Jonas Bernhard

摘要

When do federal governments listen to local governments? Although local government associations (LGAs) are among the most important lobbying actors in modern democracies, we still know very little about when and why LGAs can shape federal decision-making according to their preferences. Addressing this research gap, this article investigates the conditions for lobbying success of LGAs in the German Bundestag during the 19th legislative period (2017–2021). Applying the main explanatory factors for lobbying success from the literature on business and public interest groups to LGAs, this article argues that intergovernmental lobbying success can be explained by actor- and issue-level characteristics. The research hypotheses are tested using a novel dataset of 555 legislative requests from LGAs to 87 bills discussed in the public hearings of the Bundestag’s standing committees. Logistic regression analyses reveal that LGAs are more likely to attain their preferences if a) their requests are to preserve the status quo, b) they form a unified lobbying coalition, c) they submit a larger amount of technical information, d) their requests are supported by the Bundesrat, and e) they lobby on less complex bills. In sum, the findings enhance our understanding of local interest representation in federal systems.