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<p>The EU is often criticised for its market orientation and the lack of effective social policy, stemming from soft recommendations and limited fiscal instruments. Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether the Commission’s increased leverage and conditionalities under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) can drive national social policy reforms. This article addresses this question by analysing Latvia and Estonia as two extreme cases of fiscal conservatism and underperforming welfare systems. Theoretically situated between coordinative and coercive Europeanization and empirically drawing on 23 interviews with national and EU officials, policy documents and press sources, the article finds that the Commission effectively used RRF incentives and conditionalities to push for tax-funded social reforms in line with social CSRs, even against national preferences. It argues that the Commission’s social entrepreneurship, typically studied at the supranational level, can also extend to national enforcement. However, the article cautions that hierarchical steering against national preferences can undermine democratic legitimacy and ownership.</p>

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Enforcing social standards through RRF conditionalities: the European Commission as a social advocate in Latvia and Estonia

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月16日

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  • Edgars Eihmanis

摘要

The EU is often criticised for its market orientation and the lack of effective social policy, stemming from soft recommendations and limited fiscal instruments. Meanwhile, it remains unclear whether the Commission’s increased leverage and conditionalities under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) can drive national social policy reforms. This article addresses this question by analysing Latvia and Estonia as two extreme cases of fiscal conservatism and underperforming welfare systems. Theoretically situated between coordinative and coercive Europeanization and empirically drawing on 23 interviews with national and EU officials, policy documents and press sources, the article finds that the Commission effectively used RRF incentives and conditionalities to push for tax-funded social reforms in line with social CSRs, even against national preferences. It argues that the Commission’s social entrepreneurship, typically studied at the supranational level, can also extend to national enforcement. However, the article cautions that hierarchical steering against national preferences can undermine democratic legitimacy and ownership.