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<p>After the imposition of comprehensive trade sanctions on Russia in February 2022 by the EU, the US and a number of other economies, Russia’s imports of Western-branded goods dropped sharply. Using transaction-level import data specifying trademarks of imported goods, this paper shows that the reduction in imports was significantly higher for firms with more restrictive self-declared attitudes to serving the Russian market. These self-imposed “private sanctions” thus reinforced the effect of public sanctions. At the same time, goods under trademarks of Western firms that declared full withdrawal from the Russian market continued being imported into Russia, increasingly via traders located in neutral jurisdictions. This highlights limits to the effectiveness of private sanctions in the presence of intermediaries in neutral economies.</p>

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Private Sanctions and Russia’s Imports

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月2日

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  • Maxim Chupilkin,
  • Beata Javorcik,
  • Aleksandra Peeva,
  • Alexander Plekhanov

摘要

After the imposition of comprehensive trade sanctions on Russia in February 2022 by the EU, the US and a number of other economies, Russia’s imports of Western-branded goods dropped sharply. Using transaction-level import data specifying trademarks of imported goods, this paper shows that the reduction in imports was significantly higher for firms with more restrictive self-declared attitudes to serving the Russian market. These self-imposed “private sanctions” thus reinforced the effect of public sanctions. At the same time, goods under trademarks of Western firms that declared full withdrawal from the Russian market continued being imported into Russia, increasingly via traders located in neutral jurisdictions. This highlights limits to the effectiveness of private sanctions in the presence of intermediaries in neutral economies.