<p>In the present paper, I aim to show that republicanism does not need compulsory voting in order to instantiate the value of freedom from domination (the weak case against compulsory voting). Furthermore, I present several reasons why this electoral reform would be inimical to realizing this republican ideal (the strong case against compulsory voting). The first part of the paper is based on empirical data in order to deconstruct Lisa Hill’s (Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18: 652–660, 2015) argument for compulsory voting as an important tool for realizing freedom from domination. I reject both the claims that compulsory voting mitigates the problem that rampant inequalities pose in the political realm, as well as the position that it would constitute an appropriate solution to the lack of electoral and non-electoral participation. Throughout the paper, I present alternative institutional measures that would better serve these goals, and as such ought to be prioritized by republicans. I then construct a republican case against compulsory voting, which is based on two distinct arguments: firstly, that compulsory voting can dilute the important role that counter-majoritarian institutions have for republicans, by making it easier for populist movements to claim legitimacy; secondly, that compulsory voting is inimical to the materialization of the kind of resistive citizenry that republicanism necessitates (Pettit in: On the people’s terms. A Republican theory and model of democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), as it can undermine the accomplishment of “wide stability” (Lovett in: The well-ordered republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).</p>