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<p>Over a decade after the establishment of the Banking Union, European banking supervision continues to operate within a fragmented prudential framework. Despite the Single Rulebook aiming for a level playing field, national options, discretions, and heterogeneous transpositions of directives persist. This fragmentation poses pressing challenges for the ECB as single supervisor of significant institutions under the SSM, particularly given its obligation under Art.&#xa0;4(3) and 9(1) SSM Regulation to apply national law implementing Union law. Drawing on recent case law of the European Court of Justice&#xa0;this article analyses the expanding scope of national law the ECB is required to apply and the resulting&#xa0;operational and constitutional&#xa0;concerns. Against this background, it is examined whether Member States are obliged under the principle of sincere cooperation in Art.&#xa0;4(3) TEU to show restraint when exercising legislative discretion further fragmenting the supervisory framework. It argues that&#xa0;the principle of&#xa0;sincere cooperation does not impose a hard prohibition on national differentiation,&#xa0;but (only)&#xa0;entails a duty of consideration&#xa0;where&#xa0;additional national rules are not justified by genuine domestic specificities and risk undermining effective and uniform supervision. Ultimately,&#xa0;however,&#xa0;responsibility for addressing systemic fragmentation rests primarily with&#xa0;the&#xa0;EU legislator.</p>

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Sincere cooperation and national legislative autonomy: Reconciling regulatory fragmentation with the ECB’s supervisory role

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月30日

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  • Sara Elisa Dietz

摘要

Over a decade after the establishment of the Banking Union, European banking supervision continues to operate within a fragmented prudential framework. Despite the Single Rulebook aiming for a level playing field, national options, discretions, and heterogeneous transpositions of directives persist. This fragmentation poses pressing challenges for the ECB as single supervisor of significant institutions under the SSM, particularly given its obligation under Art. 4(3) and 9(1) SSM Regulation to apply national law implementing Union law. Drawing on recent case law of the European Court of Justice this article analyses the expanding scope of national law the ECB is required to apply and the resulting operational and constitutional concerns. Against this background, it is examined whether Member States are obliged under the principle of sincere cooperation in Art. 4(3) TEU to show restraint when exercising legislative discretion further fragmenting the supervisory framework. It argues that the principle of sincere cooperation does not impose a hard prohibition on national differentiation, but (only) entails a duty of consideration where additional national rules are not justified by genuine domestic specificities and risk undermining effective and uniform supervision. Ultimately, however, responsibility for addressing systemic fragmentation rests primarily with the EU legislator.