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<p>In noisy perceptual environments, people frequently make decisions based on non-perceptual information to maximize rewards. Therefore, a central problem in psychophysics, metacognition and consciousness research is to distinguish between decisions resulting from changes in subjective experience and those arising from non-perceptual information. It has recently been proposed that confidence reports can be used to discriminate between changes in subjective experience and those arising from non-perceptual information. Here we use a Bayesian ordinal modelling framework combined with an explicit measure of subjective experience to show across two experiments (<i>N</i> = 204) and three bias manipulations that confidence during perceptual decision-making does not uniquely reflect subjective experience. Instead, non-perceptual manipulations affecting response bias ‘leak’ into perceptual confidence reports. This occurs not only for biases resulting from changes in the base rate of stimuli (‘cognitive’ priors), but also when biasing information does not inform decision correctness (asymmetric payoff matrix). The relative strength of biases in first-order responses and confidence may help disentangle whether a given bias manipulation is perceptual in nature or not.</p>

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Confidence reports during perceptual decision making dissociate from changes in subjective experience

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月21日

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  • Nicolás Sánchez-Fuenzalida,
  • Simon van Gaal,
  • Stephen M. Fleming,
  • Julia M. Haaf,
  • Johannes J. Fahrenfort

摘要

In noisy perceptual environments, people frequently make decisions based on non-perceptual information to maximize rewards. Therefore, a central problem in psychophysics, metacognition and consciousness research is to distinguish between decisions resulting from changes in subjective experience and those arising from non-perceptual information. It has recently been proposed that confidence reports can be used to discriminate between changes in subjective experience and those arising from non-perceptual information. Here we use a Bayesian ordinal modelling framework combined with an explicit measure of subjective experience to show across two experiments (N = 204) and three bias manipulations that confidence during perceptual decision-making does not uniquely reflect subjective experience. Instead, non-perceptual manipulations affecting response bias ‘leak’ into perceptual confidence reports. This occurs not only for biases resulting from changes in the base rate of stimuli (‘cognitive’ priors), but also when biasing information does not inform decision correctness (asymmetric payoff matrix). The relative strength of biases in first-order responses and confidence may help disentangle whether a given bias manipulation is perceptual in nature or not.