<p>Under the circumstances where the green credit regulatory system has been implemented and the large-scale application of industrial green microgrids has occurred, the institutional constraints and clean energy technologies jointly reshape the emission reduction choices of high-tech manufacturing enterprises. This study constructs an evolutionary game model involving the government, research and development institutions, and high-tech manufacturing enterprises. Through this model, the stable equilibrium of the system’s evolution is sought, and the evolution patterns of key parameters are explored through numerical simulation. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The various input costs of the three parties constitute the threshold for emission reduction costs. The increase in costs significantly hinders green behaviors such as supervision, research and development, and active emission reduction. (2) Market-based benefits serve as the intrinsic driving force for collaborative emission reduction. The increase in technology transfer benefits and the improvement in enterprises’ green operation benefits can lead to a spontaneous shift towards a low-carbon economy. (3) The government’s policy tools exhibit differentiated effects, and research subsidies facilitate the breakthroughs in green microgrids technology. Excessive rewards can lead to a policy-dependent situation within the enterprise. Appropriate fines can rely on green credit constraints to compel enterprises to comply with emission reduction regulations. This study fills the analytical gap regarding the technical supply side in multi-party collaborative emission reduction. The conclusions provide a theoretical basis and practical reference for improving the collaborative emission reduction system, promoting the green transformation of high-tech manufacturing enterprises, and facilitating regional green and low-carbon development.</p>