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<p>Attacks on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) have become increasingly critical as Industry 4.0 connectivity expands the attack surface of industrial automation systems. Siemens S7-1200 and S7-1500 PLCs are widely deployed in manufacturing and energy sectors, making them high-value targets whose compromise can disrupt processes, threaten safety, and reduce profitability. While prior studies largely relied on simulations, their lack of experimental reproducibility limits real-world applicability. This paper proposes a reproducible methodological framework for evaluating the vulnerability of Siemens S7 PLCs in a realistic industrial network. The approach integrates physical and virtual testbeds, virtual local area network (VLAN)-based isolation, controlled penetration testing, packet-level traffic capture, and quantitative analysis. Vulnerability was assessed using Attack Success Rate (ASR), Mean Time to Recovery (MTTR), and traffic volume. Results demonstrate that layered security measures, including Transport Layer Security (TLS), VLAN segmentation, access control lists (ACLs), password hardening, and firmware updates, significantly enhance PLC resilience. The contribution of this study lies in delivering a statistically validated, hardware-inclusive, and fully reproducible vulnerability assessment framework that quantitatively measures the combined impact of layered defenses under realistic industrial network conditions.</p>

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Vulnerability assessment and mitigation for siemens S7-1200 and S7-1500 PLCs in industrial networks

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月8日

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  • Kevser Ovaz Akpinar

摘要

Attacks on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) have become increasingly critical as Industry 4.0 connectivity expands the attack surface of industrial automation systems. Siemens S7-1200 and S7-1500 PLCs are widely deployed in manufacturing and energy sectors, making them high-value targets whose compromise can disrupt processes, threaten safety, and reduce profitability. While prior studies largely relied on simulations, their lack of experimental reproducibility limits real-world applicability. This paper proposes a reproducible methodological framework for evaluating the vulnerability of Siemens S7 PLCs in a realistic industrial network. The approach integrates physical and virtual testbeds, virtual local area network (VLAN)-based isolation, controlled penetration testing, packet-level traffic capture, and quantitative analysis. Vulnerability was assessed using Attack Success Rate (ASR), Mean Time to Recovery (MTTR), and traffic volume. Results demonstrate that layered security measures, including Transport Layer Security (TLS), VLAN segmentation, access control lists (ACLs), password hardening, and firmware updates, significantly enhance PLC resilience. The contribution of this study lies in delivering a statistically validated, hardware-inclusive, and fully reproducible vulnerability assessment framework that quantitatively measures the combined impact of layered defenses under realistic industrial network conditions.